Thirty-One Hours on Grindstone Island: The Canadian and American Friends Service Committees' Experiment in Civil Defence[1]

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On August 4, 1965, thirteen persons were killed while in custody on Grindstone Island in Canada. They died in the course of an experiment in civilian national defense. The experiment was an exercise, carried out under Quaker auspices. Those 'killed' are alive today, but they live as chastened men and women. For few of them died heroically. Most of them died blindly. All of them died needlessly, brought face to face in the hour of their death with the failure of their own deeply-held attitudes and actions.

Yet all agree that the Grindstone experiment was a great moment. For some it achieved the level of religious conversion.

How did it happen?

What lessons for civilian defense and for human community can be learned from those – THIRTY-ONE HOURS…[2]

So began the Canadian Friends Service Committee's (CFSC) 1966 report on the Training Institute in Non-Violence that had been run at the Grindstone Island Peace Centre in the summer of 1965. That nine-day institute was focussed largely on a prolonged socio-drama trial in civilian defence. While the umpires who oversaw it thought that the exercise might last as long as three days, it was terminated after thirty-one hours due to the emotional crisis among participants. Judging from the in-depth report,[3] participants in CFSC's annual institute in non-violence got much more than they bargained for. The description in the recruiting material for Grindstone's 1965 program indicated merely that, "[t]he third annual institute will explore non-violent ways in which a civilian population can defend itself from tyranny, from without or within. Involves an examination of basic ideas, philosophy and principles, and of non-violent direct action."[4] Certainly role playing was an integral aspect of training in non-violent resistance. It had been used in the American Civil Rights Movement in preparation for lunch-counter sit-ins and civil rights marches throughout the south, something in which Canadian Friends had participated.[5] And, it had been an important component of the previous two institutes; the program for the 1964 institute even went as far as specifying that "applicants should be over 20 years of age and prepared for a physically vigorous experience."[6] But the plans for the 1965 institute were much more expansive.

The 1965 institute was to address "the two most important questions" faced by those in the peace movement – "non-violence and defence of communities against imposed tyranny." In the words of some of its planners, the exercise represented "a growing effort to transform peace-movement thinking about these subjects from sentimental intuition to scientifically based rationality."[7] As the name of the institute implied, this was to be <u>training</u> in non-violence. Plenty of time had been and was still devoted to exploring "the philosophy

and practice of non-violence"; nevertheless, the annual institutes were committed to "experiment[ing] with new ideas and methods of training in non-violent relations" [8] in order to provide pacifists with practical tools for non-violent interpersonal and political associations. CFSC had defined two long-term aims of the institutes. The committee wanted to contribute to the "small but growing body of *knowledge* and *experience*" in non-violence. It also wanted to add to the "small but growing body of *people* equipped with ideas, skills and motivations identified as 'non-violent'." While the committee recognized that ideas of non-violence were not necessarily religiously based, it was explicit that Quakers' activity in and sponsorship of the institutes was a direct extension of their belief that "'there is that of God in every man' and that love in action ('non-violence') can overcome hatred, prejudice and fear."[9] Clearly Canadian Friends were determined to be active in the Friends World Committee's revisioning of the traditional Quaker peace testimony to reflect the realities of a Cold War world.[10] They believed strongly that this required more than philosophical and spiritual musings, but practical, hands-on approaches as well.

Driven by their concerns over the "crisis in Vietnam,"[11] the build up of nuclear weapons and policies of deterrence, and the isolation of China and Cuba,[12] Canadian Friends formally created the Peace Committee under the auspices of CFSC in January 1964 [13] for the express purpose of supporting the Quaker stance against all war.[14] Canadian Friends had already determined in the mid-1950s that there was no room for the ideology of lesser evil in their interpretation of the peace testimony.[15] As the peace testimony continued to grow in response to global uncertainties,[16] Friends seized the opportunities allowed to them by the Peace Centre at Grindstone Island to pursue practical methods to combat what appeared to be an increasingly violent world on the verge of what one CFSC worker called "universal suicide."[17] "Thirty-one Hours," as it came to be known, was a marked expression of Canadian Friends' determination to provide meaningful tools of peace for what appeared to be an increasingly violent world. While the experiment itself offered little to advance the theory of civilian defence, it did bring to light important differences between the Quaker worldview of non-violence motivated by spiritual beliefs to create a better world and the strategy of civilian defence motivated by the desire to preserve the status quo.

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The peace efforts of CFSC in the 1960s were heavily influenced by a number of unique political and personal factors. As a "middle power,"[18] Canada was positioned to play a key role in Cold War politics. Indeed, throughout the 1950s, Canada had already had a distinct impact on the manner in which the politics of the "new" post-1945 world order would unfold. Lester B. Pearson's solution to the Suez Crisis in 1956 (separating the combatants with a neutral peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United Nations) earned him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 and placed the United Nations and its new peacekeeping forces at the centre of global conflict. Canadians may have been, and continue to be, smug about their "peacemaking" accomplishments as they cast their eyes south to their "militaristic" neighbours.[19] But Canada has always been keenly aware of its proximity to its superpower neighbour to the south. This was so finely and eloquently

summed by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's comments to the National Press Club in Washington, DC: "Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt." [20]

In 1963, when the Grindstone Island Peace Centre began, relations between the two countries were very poor as Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and President John F. Kennedy went head-to-head on the issue of unmanned BOMARC missiles outfitted with nuclear warheads. [21] The previous autumn, the world had watched in horror as the Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded. Diefenbaker's hesitation to respond to Kennedy's request that Canadian forces be put on high alert (Defcon 3 status) brought a distinct chill to a relationship that had been quite pleasant under Eisenhower and Diefenbaker. When diplomat, Lester B. Pearson, became prime minister in 1963, it appeared as if the situation might improve. And indeed it did, but not for long. The nadir of Canadian-American relations came in the spring of 1965 (just as preparations for Thirty-One Hours were underway). Throughout 1964, Pearson had resisted American pressure to enter the war in Vietnam. Then, in April 1965 he used a speech at Philadelphia's Temple University to suggest that peace negotiations in Vietnam would go much more smoothly if Americans would stop bombing North Vietnam. President Lyndon Johnson was furious. He summoned Pearson to Camp David where he dismissed the prime minister much as someone would a disobedient puppy dog.[22] The whole Vietnam situation led many Canadians to question American foreign policy. Still, Canada could not disentangle itself from its continental orientation. It seemed to be a foregone conclusion and an accepted aspect of Canadian foreign policy that, should the USSR invade the United States, Soviets would attack through Canada or fire missiles over Canadian airspace. Either way, Canada was geographically located smack dab in the middle of disputes between the two super powers. This gave an entirely new meaning to the term "middle power," a position about which Canadians were not at all enthusiastic. Nonetheless, Canadian and American economies and military policies had become so interconnected since WWII,[23] that separating Canadian from American interests in matters of defence seemed impossible. In this context, CFSC worked diligently to educate Canadians on the possibilities for peace and it was in the area of peace education that CFSC made some of its greatest strides in the 1960s.

Murray Thomson who became peace education secretary in 1962 played a particularly influential role in the development of CFSC's approach to peace education in the 1960s. By the time Thomson arrived in Toronto (headquarters to CFSC) in 1962 he had accumulated a wealth of experience in adult education, interpersonal relations, public affairs and the arts. His work was certainly an expression of a man with a Quaker conscience. After graduating from university in 1947, he worked in the Adult Education Division of the Saskatchewan government when Tommy Douglas – the man considered to be responsible for Canadian Medicare – was premier. In 1956 he went on to Southeast Asia, first to Bangkok with UNESCO and then in 1957 on to Delhi with the American Friends Service Committee.[24] While in Delhi, Thomson became acquainted with the Ghandian leadership and was deeply affected by Ghandian principles of passive resistance. Those principles infused his work with CFSC throughout

his time as peace education secretary. When he returned to Canada in 1962, he wanted "to work for peace," but was not sure how or where he would do that. He went to CFSC and offered his services as peace education secretary; CFSC gladly accepted the offer. Four days after he began in his new post, Diana Wright, an old friend who had been active in the radical Farmer-Labour-Teacher Institutes in Saskatchewan, appeared at Friends House offering CFSC the use of Grindstone Island as a non-profit peace education centre, for $1 per year, plus ongoing expenses. Wright owned an island that she wanted used to advance peace education; CFSC was looking for a single training location for the peace movement. As Friends say, it seemed as if "the way had opened" for CFSC to pursue aggressive peace education in North America.[25]

Grindstone Island is an 11.5 acre island located in Lake Rideau near Portland, Ontario. For the first half of the twentieth century, it was the summer home of Admiral Kingsmill, founder of the Canadian Navy. When Admiral and Lady Kingsmill died, the island passed to their daughter, Diana Wright, who in turn offered it to Friends on a long-term lease. It opened in the summer of 1963 as the Grindstone Island Peace Centre, "dedicated to the work of reconciliation in the nation and the world." Between 1963 and 1975, CFSC maintained the island with the aim of studying and encouraging efforts towards domestic and international peace and justice.[26] While it was in operation, the Grindstone Island Peace Centre hosted numerous programs including UNESCO seminars, *in camera* diplomats' conferences, an annual French-English Dialogue, and a yearly Training Institute in Non-violence.

Certainly one of the most memorable moments in the island's history was the 1965 experiment on non-violence and civilian defence. The socio-drama experiment, co-sponsored by the Canadian and American Friends Service Committees, was the result of the confluence of a number of factors. The island's summer non-violence institutes had become annual affairs and had attracted a number of regular participants. Moreover, since the institutes of the two previous years had included role playing and limited socio-drama exercises, an extension of those projects seemed logical.[27] The relative isolation of the island coupled with the commitment of participants "offered the opportunity for intensive controlled experimentation."[28] Coincidentally, civilian defence appeared to be the kind of subject open to study by extended socio-drama techniques, and some members of the planning committee were particularly keen on and had great knowledge in the proposed subject and technique. For these reasons, CFSC with the assistance of the American Friends Service Committee's Program on Nonviolence made the decision to focus the 1965 institute on an extended socio-drama in "social defence," a more refined aspect of the broader concept of civilian defence. The main idea behind social defence was the "defense not of a territory as such, but of the characteristic institutions of a society." [29]

Fifty-one applicants[30] were selected to participate in the simulated experiment in social defence. All had some interest in civilian defence and non-violence; all were willing to engage in an extensive socio-drama experiment designed to explore the relation between the two concepts; but, other than the planning committee of six people (three of whom were later designated as umpires), none had any knowledge of the particular exercise that was planned. The group arrived on the island on

30 July. Following two days of conventional institute approaches to the questions of non-violence and civilian defence, the island steering committee announced the exercise. The group was presented with a scenario calling for the defence of the institute against a United States-supported right wing Canadian government. It was posited that, in the wake of Quebec's secession from Canada and the consequent disintegration of the country, an illegitimate government "had occupied major portions of the Canadian heartland."[31] The legitimate Canadian government had moved to Winnipeg, where it was of no use. The defenders of the institute had no idea what the attitude of this US-supported government would take toward it or precisely when any action would be taken. After the scenario was presented, the institute's formal leadership dissolved itself, leaving the group free to take whatever steps it deemed necessary. The decision as to when the exercise would be terminated was left in the hands of the six umpire-observers. A number of others took the opportunity to leave the island before the experiment began. This left thirty-one "defenders," including a number of children.

On 3 August, two days after the presentation of the scenario, six armed men representing the new government arrived on the island and announced that the institute's people were in temporary custody. The defenders, with varying levels of experience and only a limited general background in civilian defence theory, reacted to their captivity.[32] According to their own subsequent judgements, the defenders followed a consistently disastrous course of action. Their interactions with the Unionist invaders were quite disastrous. They were combative,[33] there were serious problems of truth and openness among the defenders,[34] and both sides misinterpreted communication based on the one-dimensional view each group had of the other.[35] By the beginning of the second day, when the defenders came to a partial recognition of their true plight, it was too late. As the analysts pointed out, "both sides were swept by the inertia of their previous courses" into a bloody confrontation that 'killed' a dozen defenders (one defender had been 'killed' an hour before this clash). The occupation's political goals of maintaining an orderly custody had been defeated; nevertheless, their physical control of the island was more secure than ever. At that point, the umpires began to fear for the psychological safety of a number of the surviving defenders who were in serious emotional shock and "incapable of further sustained action."[36] The umpires terminated the exercise at 10:05 p.m. on Wednesday, 4 August. It required several days of sensitive programming to bring the participants both to a state of emotional and intellectual equilibrium. By all appearances, the experiment was a failure, but was it?

Certainly the social scientists considered that valuable lessons had been learned, but more than that, the exercise reveals a key component of Quaker interpretations about peace and the peace testimony in the twentieth century. For Friends, peace had become much more than the absence of war. Just as the challenges of the 1950s had yielded agreement that there was no place for the principle of the lesser evil in the peace testimony, the experiences of the 1960s cemented acceptance of the theory and social application of non-violence. Consider attempts to coordinate broader peace efforts. One of Thomson's first responsibilities when he became peace education secretary was to poll Canadian Friends on their attitude towards a collaborative peace effort with other peace

organizations.[37] The responses are illuminating. In all cases, Friends from around the country supported collective action on the condition that unique Quaker attitudes towards peace could be expressed and were *never* compromised.[38] Montreal Friends were particularly forthright: "'The Friends' peace education program can make important contributions to the Peace Movement only when it is a courageous, personal and collective self-expression of such a re-discovered sense of Quaker identity regarding Peace."[39] Grindstone Island was considered the best starting point for co-operation and co-ordination of activities among peace groups. [40] In that light, the Grindstone Island Planning Committee was mindful of the concern "to cultivate the type of spiritual atmosphere on the Island desired by Friends, both for programs sponsored by CFSC and other groups."[41] It was this commitment to the spiritual aspects of non-violence and peace that created the tension and difficulties in the 1965 institute.

The group that convened on Grindstone Island that summer were a dissimilar assembly of student-age activists from the peace and civil rights movements, mature women and men from a number of walks of life, and children ranging in age from two to fifteen years. There were a number of Quakers, but also atheists, Catholics, Jews and Protestants of other denominations. [42] In the short period of time available to them before the beginning of the socio-drama, the participants had a difficult time becoming a community that worked together, even though Quaker ideology drew some in the group to work towards that end.[43] The group adopted the term "community" to refer to itself yet, a sense of unity and cohesion never emerged. As the report's authors later pointed out, "the group was heterogeneous, had sharp ideological and methodological differences and had not been together long enough even to learn each others' names." [44] Any dissimilarity that existed between individual defenders was exacerbated as the scenario unfolded and disagreement about the principles underlying non-violence and civilian defence became heightened. This is apparent as the group wrestled with their response to the first casualty of the exercise. One group wanted group confrontation; the other group insisted that such a response would almost certainly amount to mass suicide/murder. During the discussion, one participant characterized the tactics used up to that point as "'young men's tricks'—not helpful and not really non-violent … [since] there had been no love involved." [45] The stress of the exercise coupled with the death of one of the defenders brought the divergence of the two ideologies into stark relief.

Non-violence in the Quaker context was considered a positive doctrine and set of action techniques; it was a way of life. Civilian defence theory, on the other hand, had become a matter of interest to political theorists and strategists who had no prior attachment to non-violence. Even its terminology was that of strategy, of military models, of resistance and revolution, and of behavioural science.[46] There was a recognized tension between civilian defence theorists and those oriented towards pacifist non-violence. That tension was manifest during the 1965 exercise in a way it had not been in previous years. Any role playing that had been done in earlier institutes took place over a span of two to five hours, a time brief enough to carry out scenarios in the context of pacifist action assumptions and tactics.[47] A much longer exercise, with a clearly political scenario, necessarily required the use of civilian defence theories and tactics. Not everyone was

equally versed in those theories and tactics, and a number of people were not even certain that they were of any value in the context of non-violent resistance. After the idea of civilian defence was initially presented to the group, it drew sharp reactions. Some of the pacifist participants charged that civilian defence "was merely a form of guerrilla warfare." Others asserted that to the extent that civilian defence depended on non-violence, it could never be used successfully to defend an exploitative or a corrupt society; in other words, "in a world of *have-nots*, non-violence can never be used successful to preserve a *have* society." [48] Those who favoured civilian defence theory accused the pacifists of wanting to defend a society that did not yet exist, except in the idealist notions of the pacifists' minds. They went on to suggest that, if that was the case, that pacifists had no business talking about national defence since "their ideas [were] confessedly irrelevant to present and foreseeable circumstances of international affairs." On the other hand, they proposed that if pacifists were earnest in aiding individuals and nations to defend themselves using less violent or better methods than were currently in use, they needed to teach non-violence accepting that individuals had the right to defend what they "presently [held] dear, not what pacifists think they ought to hold dear." [49] For those who favoured civilian defence theory, the concept was clearly not about creating a better or more equal society, but about defending the community or society without resorting to violence. This was almost impossible for Quaker pacifists to accept. They simply could not separate their commitment to non-violence from their general commitment to social justice.

The post-exercise evaluation period was marked by differences of opinion and demonstrated the stark juxtaposition of the philosophies of non-violence and civilian defence. Those who were strong proponents of one side tended to cast the "failure" of the exercise on the other ideology. A recurring theme expressed by pacifists was their conviction that non-violence was a positive philosophy in that it built towards something better unlike civilian defence which merely preserved. Quaker pacifism was a worldview that inspired a way of life in which peace and non-violence were one component of a larger, spiritual whole; civilian defence was a tactic to maintain the status quo. It seemed as if the exercise had increased the distance between the two philosophies rather than bringing them closer together. As the authors of the report noted, "the distance remains great between an approach beginning from a set of principles and moral axioms and one beginning from the requirements of effective defense in the event of military occupation." They acknowledged that the lack of a real sense of community might have had an impact on the outcome since they did not consider it "surprising that an adventitious group of inquirers failed to bring the two into serious or continuing contact."[50]

The 1965 institute and its report sparked much interest among Canadian Friends, and raised many questions about non-violence, civilian defence, and civil disobedience. Were non-violence and civilian defence compatible or not? Since civil disobedience seemed to be connected to civilian defence, was it an acceptable tool of non-violence? During the winter of 1965 – 66, many meetings and individual Friends became involved in study programs and lectures on the issue. CFSC kept tabs on all of the activity and noted the disquiet among many Canadian Quakers who were "not clear how far it is right to go with

civil disobedience."[51] It was a question with which Friends would continue to wrestle. In the end, Thirty-One Hours provided few practical solutions or strategies in non-violence training. As its analysts suggested, "the whole experiment proved very little directly about the value of civilian defense or its social defense variant." [52] It did, however, allow Friends the opportunity to test the practicality of non-violence and collaborative peace efforts. The institute was the manifestation of a dream that had been voiced in the 1955 AFSC publication *Speak Truth to Power:*

> There is now almost no place in our great universities, few lines in the budgets of our great foundations, and little space in scholarly journals, for thought and experimentation that begin with the unconditional rejection of organized mass violence and seek to think through the concrete problems of present international relations in new terms. It is time there was. [53]

Quakers took on their own challenge and engaged in experiments that the secretaries of both CFSC and AFSC admitted were risky. And they discovered that while the peace testimony could continue to change in response to a changing world, the foundations of the worldview from which it had sprung – a worldview that decried all war – could not be compromised.

Notes:

[1] This paper is part of a larger project on the Quaker peace testimony and Quakers and the peace movement in twentieth century Canada. I would like to thank Sandra Fuller for drawing my attention to the Grindstone Island experiment and Canadian Yearly Meeting Archives (CYMA) archivist, Jane Zavitz-Bond, for providing such free access to the materials.

[2] Theodore Olsen and Gordon Christiansen, *The Grindstone Experiment: Thirty-One Hours* (Toronto: Canadian Friends Service Committee, 1966), cover, CFSC Papers, CYMA. Hereafter *The Grindstone Experiment*.

[3] The authors of the report, Theodore (Ted) Olsen and Gordon Christiansen, had both been on the planning committee for the experiment and were active participants in the 1965 institute. Both were American academics. Olsen was the theoretician. He had completed his PhD, examining the theological aspects of non-violent direct action, in 1962, shortly before becoming involved with the experiment at Grindstone Island. He had also published articles in the field of non-military defence for the Peace Research Institute in Oslo as well in Canada, the United States, and Europe. Christiansen was committed to hands-on application of non-violent resistance theory and was active in what he called the "radical, non-violent peace movement." He had commanded an artillery battery in WWII; after returning home from the war, he became a pacifist and a professor of chemistry. He was critical of deterrence theory and of the US civil defence program and had gone as far as leading a walk-in at the Pentagon to protest American military policy. *The Grindstone Experiment*, authors' biographies and personal communication with former CFSC peace secretary, Murray Thomson, 2 June 2006.

[4] Grindstone Island '65: 3rd Annual Summer Program, CFSC Papers, CYMA.

[5] "The Peace Correspondent: A Newsletter of the CFSC Peace Committee," passim through the 1960s, CFSC Papers, CYMA. Hereafter, "The Peace Correspondent."

[6] Grindstone Island Peace Centre of the Canadian Friends Service Committee (Quakers): Summer Program 1964, CFSC papers, CYMA. The reports of the first two institutes in non-violence included analysis of role playing situations that were closely connected to the Civil Rights Movement. These included situations such as lunch-counter sit-ins and segregation in a barbershop (Murray Thomson and Ralph Eames, "Grindstone Island 1963 – A Venture in Peace Education,"

and "CFSC Report of the Second Annual Training Institute in Non-Violence," CFSC Papers, CYMA.

[7] *The Grindstone Experiment*, v.

[8] Grindstone Island Peace Centre: Summer Program 1964. See also "Grindstone Island 1963 – A Venture in Peace Education," section VIII.

[9] "CFSC Report of the Second Annual Training Institute in Non-Violence," 3. All emphasis in original.

[10] Fred Haslam, the former general secretary of CFSC, reported to the peace committee that the Friends World Committee had decided to "enlarge the traditional peace testimony to better encompass the complexities of the modern world." Minutes of the 7th Meeting of the CFSC Peace Committee, 2 November 1964, Minute #34. CFSC Papers, CYMA.

[11] This is how the situation in Vietnam was regularly referred to in CFSC records.

[12] These are the primary issues of importance that emerge out of the CFSC records. Obviously there were other concerns as well, including equality for women, concern over First Nations rights, and support of the Civil Rights Movement in the US. Those types of concerns were dealt with under the Minorities Committee of CFSC; the Peace Committee, which is the focus here, addressed those matters directly related to domestic and international peace.

[13] Minutes of the 1st meeting of the CFSC Peace Committee, 16 January 1964.

[14] The priorities of the peace committee were finalized by August 1964. Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the CFSC Peace Committee, 20 August 1964. Minute #32.

[15] The discussion of the philosophy of the lesser evil and its place in the Quaker peace testimony came about as a result of a disastrous situation between the British Columbia government and a group of Doukhobors called the Sons of Freedom. CFSC and AFSC were deeply involved in helping Doukhobors settle and assimilate in Canada. In 1950, an American Friend, Emmett Gulley, had been sent as the representative of the service committees to assist in smoothing relations between the Freedomites and their neighbours, the RCMP, and provincial government with whom they seemed to be in constant confrontation. Gulley developed a very close relationship with government officials—so close that he went on the government payroll eighteen months after he arrived in British Columbia. When, in 1954, the newly elected Social Credit government decided to arrest some Freedomite parents and remove their children to be educated in publicly-funded residential schools, it appeared to the Sons of Freedom that Quakers, through Gulley, were complicit in the seizure. This led to a prolonged and painful discussion among Friends about the appropriateness of the notion of the lesser evil. At the end of 1955, the service committees were firm in their decision: "The Society of Friends is founded on the belief that there is that of God in <u>every</u> man. No one, however depraved, can be considered beyond redemption through the overcoming power of love. To admit any limitations in this philosophy is to destroy it, for faith is only valid if it is limitless. Thus the doctrine of the lesser evil can have no application for a religious society." ("A Report on a survey of Friends' Work Among the Doukhobor People," 16 May 1955, CFSC Minorities Committee File, January – June 1955, CYMA). The discussions that arose in the Society of Friends as a result of the Doukhobor problems laid the foundation for future interpretations of the traditional peace testimony. For further discussion of this, see my paper, "Wrestling with the Lesser Evil: Quakers and the Sons of Freedom in mid-20th Century British Columbia," paper presented to the Canadian Society of Church History Annual Meeting, 28 May 2006, York University.

[16] Good examinations of changes to the peace testimony in the period preceding the Cold War include Peter Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) and *Freedom from Violence: Sectarian Nonresistance from the Middle Ages to the Great War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Thomas P. Socknat, *Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) and Thomas Socknat and Peter Brock, eds. *Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

[17] "The Peace Correspondent," July 1965.

[18] Arthur Andrew, *The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney* (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1993); Ann Denholm Crosby, "A

Middle-Power Military in Alliance: Canada and NORAD," *Journal ofPeace Research* 34, 1(1997): 37-52; James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964); Gerald Friesen, "Majority Culture in English Canada 1940-1975: Living on an American Continent," *Zeitschrift der Gessellschaft fur Kanada-Studien* 11, 1-2(1991): 5-14; John W. Holmes, *Canada, a Middle-aged Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976) and "Most Safely in the Middle," *International Journal* 39, 2(1984): 366-388; and, F. H. Soward, "On Becoming and Being a Middle Power: The Canadian Experience," *Pacific Historical Review* 32, 2(1963): 111-136.

[19] Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize did not only mark the Canadian invention of the UN Blue Helmets. It also gave rise to Canada's self-reinvention as a nation dedicated to international peacekeeping in the service of human compassion, responsibility, and protection. Historians J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer have remarked ironically on this that, "if nations must have images, it is certainly better for Canadians to think of themselves as umpires, as morally incarnate, than as mass murderers or warmongers" (*From Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* [Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994], 350).

[20] Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 25 March 1969.

[21] After scrapping the AVRO Arrow project, Diefenbaker had agreed to purchase American BOMARC missiles and build launching sites on Canadian soil in order to maintain Canada's defence commitments to NATO. In order to be effective, the missiles needed to be armed with nuclear warheads. Kennedy could not permit nuclear technology out of American control and Diefenbaker refused to concede control of Canadian defence sites to Americans. This led to a standoff that was not resolved during Diefenbaker's term in office.

[22] According to Canadian legend, when Pearson arrived at Camp David, Johnson grabbed him by the lapels, shook him, and shouted "Dammit, Les, you pissed on my rug!" Pearson later recounted that the meeting was acrimonious, but insisted the two parted cordially. Pearson was ever the diplomat. After this incident, Johnson and Pearson have further contacts, including two meetings in Canada and many Canadians remember the Pearson years as a time Canada-U.S. relations greatly improved.

[23] The Ogdensburg Agreement (1940) and Hyde Park Declaration (1941) signed during WWII brought Canada firmly into the American sphere of influence and cemented continentalism over imperialism in Canadian foreign policy. This was further fortified with the signing of NATO in 1949. During early negotiations on NATO in 1948, Canada fought for the inclusion into the draft treaty of an article indicating general economic and social aims over and above the American idea of a purely military pact. Canada's interests were in trying to strengthen links with western Europe in an attempt to contain the military dominance of the US. The Canadian article did get included in the treaty, in spite of American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's, opposition to "typical Canadian moralizing." (Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* [Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990], 183.). The "Canadian article" was never put into practice, since the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 ensured that the treaty was almost exclusively a military alliance. The signing of NATO marked a diplomatic revolution in Canadian foreign policy. By 1950, Canada had traded independence for security and had become in many ways a satellite of the US. The final step was taken with the signing in 1957 of NORAD (the North American Air Defence Agreement). This essentially linked the militaries of the two countries for the purposes of North American security.

[24] Personal communication with Murray Thomson, 2 June 2006 and 8 June 2006. Thomson notes that while he was in Delhi as a representative of AFSC, he had CFSC "moral support."

[25] While Grindstone Island was located in Canada and was run by CFSC, its use was international. Its proximity to Friends in New York State and the New England area as well as to those in Pennsylvania meant that it was well used by American Friends. In fact, twenty-one of the fifty participants in Thirty-One Hours were American. According to Murray Thomson, this was representative of American participation in Grindstone programs.

[26] In 1975 Wright decided she wanted to sell the island in order to finance a writing project. A group known as

the friends of Grindstone formed a co-operative company to purchase the island from Wright and to continue its operation as a centre for peace. It continued in this way until the early 1990s when it was sold for private use.

[27] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 1.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] This included six staff members who were considered neutral throughout the exercise.

[31] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 2.

[32] Ibid., 2.

[33] Ibid., 30.

[34] Ibid., 29. For instance, after the Unionists had declared that food would only be available to adults with the use of ration cards, some defenders tried to enlist a child to steal food to supply the adults. In another incident, some of the defenders meddled with the radio tower "cutting off" communications with the mainland. When confronted by the Unionists about what they were doing near the tower, they claimed they were sunbathing. Unionists knew this was not the case and recorded their lack of trust in the defenders.

[35] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 33-35.

[36] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 2.

[37] The organizations specifically named were: Canadian Peace Research Institute, Voice of Women, Fellowship of Reconciliation, United Nations Association, Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and World Federalists. Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the CFSC Peace Committee, 16 January 1964, Appendix A.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the CFSC Peace Committee, 16 January 1964, Minute #6.

[41] Minutes of the 3rd Meeting Grindstone Island Planning Committee, 11 April 1964, Minute 16 and Minutes of the 4th Grindstone Island Planning Committee, 31 October 1964, Minute 23. Quote from minute 23.

[42] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 2.

[43] Ibid., 28-9.

[44] Ibid., 28.

[45] Ibid., 16.

[46] Ibid., 37.

[47] Murray Thomson and Ralph Eames, "Grindstone Island 1963 – A Venture in Peace Education," and "CFSC Report of the Second Annual Training Institute in Non-Violence."

[48] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 37.

[49] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 37-8.

[50] Ibid., 38.

[51] *The Peace Correspondent* 2, no. 3(November 1965): 1.

[52] *The Grindstone Experiment*, 42.

[53] Society of Friends, American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Nonviolence* (np, 1955).

[54] Personal communication with Murray Thomason, 2 June 2006.